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S
ince 2003 the government has created a market in primary 
care and replaced the old general medical services contract 
governing general practitioners with a range of alternatives. 
The changes gave primary care trusts in England, health 
boards in Scotland, and local health boards in Wales new 
powers to negotiate contracts with commercial companies.1 2 Many 
of the changes to regulation were intended to facilitate the entrance of 
new providers to the healthcare market.3 General practitioners are no 
longer contracted directly to the NHS but to the firms or practices that 
contract with primary care trusts in the market. These bodies are in 
turn regulated largely through the market mechanism of commercial 
contracting. We explain how the reforms change the basis of govern-
ment control and mechanisms for public accountability in primary 
care and the possible effects on staff and patients.
Breaking the monopoly
The primary care market is premised on the break-up of the general 
practitioners’ monopoly of the provision of primary care. From 
1948 until 1997 GPs were contracted to work for the NHS under 
a general medical services contract between the secretary of state 
and the individual practitioner, on terms negotiated nationally. The 
contract was set out in the provisions of the Red Book, an extensive 
set of guidelines and regulations covering range and quality of serv-
ices, staffing, and premises.
The national contract was broken in 1997 
by the introduction of personal medical 
services contracts, which allowed local negotiations between general 
practitioners and commissioners about service specification.4 In 2003 
the Health and Social Care (Community Health and Standards) Act 
ended the general practitioners’ monopoly over the provision of pri-
mary care to the NHS, allowing primary care trusts to commission 
care from “anyone capable of securing the delivery of such services.”5 
The national agreement under which general practitioners were con-
tracted directly to the secretary of state for health was replaced by 
four contracts: 
•	 A new general medical services contract between practices and   
 trusts
•	 An alternative provider of medical services contract5 
•	 A locally negotiated personal medical services contract 
•	 A primary care trust medical services contract enabling trusts to  
 employ general practitioners directly on salary.
General practitioners no longer have a direct contractual relation-
ship with the state because the contract is between the practice or the 
company and the primary care trust. They may continue as partners 
in a practice; as employees of practices, trusts, or corporations; as 
directors or shareholders of commercial companies providing pri-
mary care; or as subcontractors to whatever entity holds the primary 
contract.
In March 2007 about 30 companies held commercial contracts to 
provide primary care services in England through their ownership 
of 74 health centres and general practices, excluding out of hours 
contracts (table). The companies comprise general practitioner owned 
and operated companies; international healthcare cor-
porations, including drug companies; companies with 
commercial links to the drug industry and healthcare 
corporations; companies providing catering, cleaning, 
and laundry services under private hospital contracts; 
and some joint ventures between these.
General practitioners’ professional control over 
the range and provision of primary care services 
has been substantially reduced. Before the reforms 
doctors were contracted by the government to pro-
vide “all necessary and appropriate medical services 
of the type usually provided by general medical prac-
titioners.”6 The arrangement specified doctors’ condi-
tions of service to the NHS in terms that maximised 
professional autonomy. Under the new standard 
contract it is contractors, not general practitioners, 
who have the duty to provide services “appropriate 
to meet the reasonable needs of . . . patients.”7 It is 
the contractor’s duty to manage services required by 
patients registered with them, “offering a consulta-
tion and, where appropriate, physical examination for 
the purpose of identifying the need, if any, for treat-
ment or further investigation; and the making available 
of such treatment or further investigation as is necessary 
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and appropriate.”7 Contractors may also determine the way in 
which services are delivered and determine, “in their reasonable 
opinion,” when home visits take place, when out of hours services 
are offered, who is removed from patient lists, and which seri-
ous incidents relevant to a contractor’s performance are notified 
to primary care trusts. Furthermore, the new system allows for 
contractors to manage specialist services formerly provided in 
hospitals but moved out into the community.
Change in legal basis for service provision
The introduction of commercial providers changes the legal basis of 
service provision, moving it from public law under direct government 
control to private commercial law. Whereas NHS contracts between 
primary care trusts and providers of primary medical services are non-
legal agreements between NHS bodies—that is, trusts and strategic 
health authorities—commercial providers have commercial contracts 
that are enforceable in courts under private law. 
Contracts with limited liability companies mean that the NHS can-
not obtain redress beyond the value of the company’s shareholding 
if the company fails to deliver on its contracts or becomes bankrupt. 
The NHS commissioner has no recourse to other assets or income 
of the shareholders.
Unbundling primary care services
General practitioners are no longer bound to provide their patients 
with integrated and comprehensive services. The new contract has 
separated out primary care services into essential services, which are 
the minimum that must be provided to patients who are ill; additional 
services, such as screening, child health surveillance, and immunisation; 
and enhanced services, including such things as management of chronic 
diseases, minor surgery, and more specialist services currently provided 
in hospitals, which a practice can choose whether to provide. 
An important consequence of this is that these services can be 
subcontracted to different providers. New entrants to the market are 
no longer committed to provide a full array of primary services to 
all patients but may select the services they wish to provide, if the 
primary care trust agrees.
Regulatory framework and professional control
The change from professional regulation and direct government con-
trol to commercial contracting has been introduced in advance of a 
system to regulate the new market, which was only being consulted 
on in November 2006.3 The Department of Health proposes that 
market forces should be the principal regulatory control on contrac-
tors. “Effective use of competition” and “healthy competition between 
different services users,” not “top-down performance management” 
is the preferred model, according to the consultation document.3 In 
this model regulation is chiefly through the contracts.
Although the proposals do not provide for a new primary and com-
munity services regulatory framework,8 several acts of deregulation 
accompany the reformed contracting system. Firstly, freedoms have 
been introduced to increase contractors’ ability to manage new finan-
cial risks by adjusting their cost base and restructuring their costs. For 
example, the government allows alternative primary care providers 
considerable freedom with respect to staff terms and conditions and the 
mix of staff employed. The contract prices, although negotiated locally 
with primary care trusts, are not necessarily bound by national agree-
ments such as the terms of employment for salaried general practition-
ers9 or a requirement to guarantee NHS pensions for their employees, 
or detailed requirements about the way in which care is provided.
Secondly, the introduction of practice based commissioning gives 
contractors budgetary control over a wider range of services. Con-
tractors can hold the NHS budget not just for primary care but also 
for acute hospital care and community services, making them both 
gatekeepers to and budget holders for services.
Thirdly, quality regulations do not apply to all providers. Service 
quality is the responsibility of the primary care trust and is regulated 
through the quality and outcomes framework. Although the quality 
and outcomes framework is the element of the new contract that has 
most exercised general practitioners, it does not apply to alternative 
contractors. These contractors therefore have greater latitude to adopt 
new models of care, change staffing patterns and skill mix, and allo-
cate funding for services.
Fourthly, rules on the sale of goodwill have been lifted. Goodwill 
refers to the practice of valuing a business on the basis of profits 
expected to flow from the contracts it holds, in addition to the value 
of tangible assets such as buildings and equipment. Sale of goodwill 
in primary care was banned in the NHS. In April 2004, however, 
the ban was lifted for all practices providing enhanced and additional 
services, allowing practices to be bought and sold on the basis of the 
number of patients they have and the income they represent.
Finally, providers have been given the power to devote part of 
their NHS budgets to advertising their services. A voluntary code of 
practice was published in 2006 allowing providers “to make more 
information about their services available to patients and referring 
clinicians in order to help them make choices and advise patients.”10 
However, no limits were set on the proportion of NHS spending that 
can be devoted to advertising.
Implications of the reforms
John Reid’s statement that the new general practitioner contract 
“signals the most ambitious attempt to reform primary care services 
since the creation of the NHS” is fully justified.11 The government 
has moved away from direct government control and systems of 
professional regulation to a system where commercial contracts 
awarded to competing providers constitute the government’s pre-
ferred model of public service reform.3
The changes raise important questions about government control 
and public accountability. Although primary care trusts are formally 
responsible for primary and community services, it is not clear 
how they will be able to influence the market when commercial 
contracts are in place.
The Department of Health proposes that management of finan-
cial performance will not be extended to privately owned providers 
but will be the responsibility of “their owners/trustees/sharehold-
ers.”3 This proposal is at odds with an earlier commitment by gov-
ernment to Lord Sharman’s recommendations that public money 
should remain publicly accountable even when it is channelled 
through private firms.12 So how will NHS spending be accounted 
for in the new primary care market?
the national contract was broken in 
1997 by the introduction of personal 
medical services contracts
heAlth Policy
476	 	 	 BMJ | 8 SepteMBer 2007 | VoluMe 335
Recent inquiries by the National Audit Office and the public 
accounts committee into out of hours services13 and the consult-
ants’ contract14 suggest that primary care trusts and the Department 
of Health have insufficient information and knowledge to negotiate 
clinical care contracts. A National Audit Office survey of primary 
care trusts and out of hours services found that the majority of con-
tract terms were drawn up by contractors not by commissioners. 
These findings are consistent with predictions from the economics 
literature that complex services, and clinical care in particular, 
cannot be successfully regulated through contracts because com-
missioners can never specify contract terms in sufficient detail to 
meet all contingencies.15
Finally, the introduction of commercial contracts will see the 
jurisdiction for healthcare policy and law move away from national 
government to the European Union. However, the EU’s mandate 
is trade and commerce and not public health.16
The government has allowed more firms to provide NHS funded 
primary and community care because it believes that competition 
will improve the public health. But nothing is yet known about 
the consequences for access, costs, quality, and accountability. It 
is surely time to evaluate the policy.
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Companies with commercial contracts to provide primary and community 
medical services to the NHS in England (March 2007)
Company Service, area covered, contract type (where known)
Private healthcare corporations 
BK	Health	UK	 5	medical	and	health	centres	(4	practices	run	under	PMS	in	England	
and	1	GMS	Wales)
Care	UK	(formerly	
Anglia	Secure	Homes)
Out	of	hours	provision	across	Essex
7000	patient	practice	in	Barking	and	Dagenham	(APMS)
HM	Prison/Young	Offenders	Institute,	Chelmsford
HM	Prison	Wellingborough
Chilvers	McCrea	
(subsidiary	of	Mercury)
23	general	practices
Prison	care
Out	of	hours	care
Variety	of	contract	forms:	GMS,	PMS.	and	APMS
Concordia	Health 2	general	practices
IntraHealth	 4	general	practices	(PMS)
Mercury	(subsidiary	of	
Tribal	Group)
1	primary	care	centre,	City	and	Hackney	primary	care	trust	
(integrated	PMS	and	WIC	this	one	not	explained	in	footnote)
Nestor	 Out	of	hours	provider	for	44	primary	care	trusts	and	5	Welsh	health	
boards
2	primary	care	centres
Forensic	medical	services—young	offender	institutions,	police	
authorities,	detention	centres
Serco All	out	of	hours	care	for	Cornwall
Out	of	hours	care	in	Cardiff
Cardiff	and	Leicester	prisons
United	Healthcare General	practice,	Derby
Drug company
Pfizer	Health	Solutions Chronic	disease	management	for	North	Birmingham	and	East	
Birmingham	primary	care	trusts
Joint ventures
Hillingdon	Healthcare/
Harmoni
General	practice	services	in	Hillingdon	(APMS)
Harmoni	/WCI	Group	 Out	of	hours	care	for	11	primary	care	trusts	
9	primary	care	centres
General practitioner providers
Aston	Healthcare	 General	practice,	Mansfield	
Central	Surrey	Health Community	nursing
Devon	Doctors	
Cooperative
Out	of	hours	service,	Devon
GatDoc Out	of	hours	service,	Gateshead
Hurley	Group Sternhall	Lane,	Peckham
Riverside	Medical	Centre
Hurley	Clinic,	Lambeth
Local	Care	Direct Out	of	hours	service,	West	Yorkshire
NEWDOC Out	of	hours	service,	North	Warwickshire	and	District
Northern	Doctors	
Urgent	Care
Out	of	hours	service,	North	Tyneside	primary	care	trust
On	Call	Care	 Out	of	hours	service,	Maidstone
Rushcliffe	Mutual Provision	of	services	and	practice	based	commissioning	in	
Nottinghamshire	(APMS	with	primary	care	trust)
21	general	practices
SELDOC Out	of	hours	service	Lambeth,	Lewisham,	and	Southwark
Shropdoc Out	of	hours	service	for	Shropshire,	Telford	and	Wrekin,	Powys	and	
Wrexham
Thamesdoc Out	of	hours	service	for	Surrey	primary	care	trust
Wayside	 Surrey	Heath	and	Woking	local	prison	(APMS)
Wolverhampton	
Doctors	on	Call
Out	of	hours	service	for	primary	care	trust	
Wsdoc Out	of	hours	service	for	West	Sussex,	7	out	of	hours	surgeries
GMS=	General	medical	services	contract,	PMS=personal	medical	services	contract,	
APMS=alternative	provider	of	medical	services	contract.
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